The studies presented in this article investigate the memory processes that underlie two phenomena in threshold identification: word superiority over pseudowords and the repetition effect (a prior presentation of an item facilitates later identification of that item). Codification (i.e., the development of a single memory code that can be triggered even by fragmented input information) explains the faster and more accurate identification of words than pseudowords. Our studies trace the development and retention of such codes for repeated pseudowords and examine the growth and loss of the repetition effect for both pseudowords and words. After approximately five prior occurrences, words and pseudowords are identified equally accurately in two types of threshold identification tasks, suggesting codification has been completed for pseudowords. Although the initial word advantage disappears, the accuracy of identification still increases with repetitions. The facilitation caused by repetition is not affected much by spacing within a session, but drops from one day to the next, and after a delay of one year has disappeared (new and old words were identified equally well). These results suggest an episodic basis for the repetition effect. Most important, after one year, performance is equal for old pseudowords and new and old words: all these levels are superior to that for new pseudowords, suggesting that the learned codes for pseudowords are as strong and permanent as the codes for words. A model of identification is presented in which feedback from codes and episodic images in memory facilitates letter processing. An instantiation of the model accounts for the major features of the data. 
Memory contains both permanent, general volve the activation of permanent codes in knowledge and information related to specific what has at various times been called semantic prior events. This distinction has come to be memory (Tulving, 1972) , lexical memory known as the difference between semantic (Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977) , and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972) . Word or the mental lexicon (Forster, 1976; identification tasks are of course memory 1969). Presumably, the existence of these tasks in which (long-term) memory must be permanent codes produces superior perforused to identify presented strings of letters, mance on strings of letters that form words Word identification is usually thought to incompared with strings that do not in a variety of tasks: Naming and identification (Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; • requirements for the doctoral degree at Indiana University al., 1977), lexical decision (Scarborough et by Ihe first author. This research was supported in part al., 1977) , and sometimes letter detection by NIMH grant MH12717 to Richard M. Shiffrin and (McClelland & Johnston, 1977 ; Rumelhart by a Research Grant-in-Aid from Indiana University to £ McClelland 1982) Aita Salasoo, who is currently at the Department of " , . ' . . , . Neurology, University of Maryland Hospital, Baltimore.
From thls perspective, It would seem natWe wish to thank Jerry Forshee and David Link for ural to suppose that the memory processes much of the software and hardware used to complete the involved in word identification are relatively experiments and Tim Bomgardner for assistance with free from the i n fl uence o f episodic factors information associated with spoken, handwritten, or printed words should not affect the identification process. This account is of course too simplistic; it has been realized for some time that recent presentations of printed words contribute to their subsequent identification (e.g., Feustel et al., 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Scarborough et al., 1977) . In these studies, even a single prior occurrence of a word causes faster and more accurate identification of that word in a subsequent threshold identification task-even after a considerable period of time. This phenomenon is known as the repetition effect.
Prior presentations also facilitate the identification of orthographically legal, novel letter strings that are not words but are similar to words in their structural properties (Feustel et al., 1983; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982) . Such pseudowords have no meaning and, presumably, no coded representation in the mental lexicon. Nonetheless, Feustel et al. (1983) found similar amounts of facilitation due to repetition for pseudowords and words. Comparable repetition effects for words and pseudowords suggest that recent memory episodes may improve identification for reasons other than those that cause words to be superior to pseudowords.
The theoretical bases for repetition effects and word-pseudoword differences are not yet clear. Repetition effects may be due to temporary strengthening of permanent semantic memory codes (e.g., Forbach, Stanners, & Hochhaus, 1974; Morton, 1969 Morton, , 1979 , to facilitation from memory images of specific recent presentations (e.g., Brooks, 1977; Feustel et al., 1983; Hintzman & Ludlam, 1980; Jacoby, 1983a; Jacoby & Brooks, 1984) , or to some combination of these.
Many factors may account for the advantage of words over pseudowords in identification, but we wish to focus on a factor we call codification: The development of a memory trace that responds as a single unit to a set of features and serves to label, code, name, or identify those features. Our concept of codification overlaps in part or all with previously proposed concepts such as unitization (e.g., Drewnowski & Healy, 1982; Feustel et al., 1983; Hayes-Roth, 1977; Healy, 1976) , chunking (e.g., Miller, 1956) , logogen formation (e.g., Morton, 1969 Morton, , 1979 , lexical entry (e.g., Forster, 1976) , word integration (e.g., Johnson, 1981) , and generation of a semantic node or concept (e.g., Brooks, 1977 Brooks, , 1978 McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981) . We prefer to use the neutral term codification because the other terms grew out of specific experimental contexts and carry theoretical connotations that we do not necessarily wish to imply.
We used threshold identification to examine the mechanisms underlying repetition effects and word-pseudoword differences. Our goal was the separation of the contributions of permanent, abstract memories and specific, episodic memories in identification. We used two related identification tasks introduced by Feustel et al. (1983) . The first task is called discrete threshold identification (DTI) . In DTI, a single brief exposure of a string of alphabetic characters is presented, followed by a mask, and then the subjects attempt to identify the entire string. In the second task, continuous threshold identification (CTI), exposures of a string of alphabetic characters are presented in rapid succession, each followed by a mask. On each successive exposure, the string is slightly longer relative to the mask. At a predetermined point the sequence stops and the subject attempts to identify the string. In both tasks, several final string durations are used so that psychometric functions can be generated.
In the Feustel et al. (1983) study, words were identified more accurately than pseudowords for both tasks, but the word advantage was much greater for the DTI task than it was for the CTI task. In addition, the word and pseudoword psychometric functions had about the same shape in CTI, but in DTI the pseudoword function was much flatter than the word function (though the slope effect may have been due in part to the differences in performance levels for the sampled durations). The authors suggested that the word superiority and the Lexicality X Task interaction (and even the slope differences) were linked to a concept like codification; they suggested that contact with a unitized memory code provided automatic access to an identification response. Identification was more difficult for a string for which no such unitized code was available, because an alternative and possibly superior route to identification was missing and because some of the features and letters required for identification may have been forgotten during the period needed to construct a response. They further suggested that preventing the forgetting of features was not likely to be as important in the CT1 task, because features forgotten following one exposure could be restored in the next. This would not be possible in DTI and could explain the strong Lexicality X Task interaction. Feustel et al. (1983) proposed that repetitions would be manifested as shifts in the psychometric functions for both DTI and CTI. In addition, we suggest that the shape of the DTI functions is sensitive to codification. That is, repetitions of a pseudoword will result in formation of a code for that pseudoword in memory. With repeated presentations the pseudoword functions in DTI should shift upward and steepen dramatically, perhaps even catching up with the corresponding function for words. Such a finding could be taken to reflect the process of codification. By using both CTI and DTI tasks, we hoped to trace the development and retention of both repetition effects and codification. To do this, we repeated words and pseudowords many times during an initial series of sessions and retested them after a delay of one year.
There are many procedural similarities between our three experiments, and these are reported in the General Method section. Details specific to each experiment are reported separately.
General Method

Subjects
All the subjects were students at Indiana University who were either paid or were participating in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement. All subjects reported normal or corrected-tonormal vision and were native speakers of English.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The subjects were tested individually. They were seated in a small testing booth in a dimly lit (.002 fL) room. All stimuli and prompts were presented on a Tektronix Type 602 fast phosphor (P-15) display scope. The screen was situated about 60 cm in front of the subject just below eye level. The booth also contained either a 16-button response keypad or a full keyboard, a small display unit for visual feedback, and a microphone. Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled by a PDF 11/34 computer in an adjacent room.
The display consisted of a row of eight characters (letters and/or random dot masks) presented horizontally across the center of the screen. The letter characters were lowercase Roman letters. Both the letters and the masks were formed by specifying the coordinates of dots in a rectangular grid 48 dots X 32 dots. The mean number of dots needed to form a single letter was 43. Although they were formed from dots, the line segments in the letters appeared continuous. The masks were formed by randomly positioning 43 dots in the grid. Five different masks constructed in this fashion were used.
When displayed on the scope, the individual characters subtended about .33° of visual angle horizontally and .49° vertically. The spacing between the centers of the characters was .94°. Thus, for an eight character display (the maximum size used) the total angle subtended was 6.91°. The estimated luminance directional energy for each dot constituting the characters was about .5 candlemicrosecond (see Sperling, 1971 ). The background luminance of the screen was .0004 fL.
The stimuli were selected in all cases from wordpseudoword pairs. The words were selected from the Kucera and Francis (1967) count. For each word, a matching pseudoword was generated by replacing a single pseudorandomly chosen letter (Venezky, 1970) . The pseudowords were judged to be pronounceable by three independent observers.
Procedure
A single experimental trial consisted of two phases: stimulus display and identification. Depending on the individual experiments, the display phase of a trial could consist of any one of three different configurations. The first type of display configuration was the traditional task, or DTI, which consisted of a single brief presentation of a target item immediately followed by a mask. The second type of display configuration consisted of a series of DTI display configurations presented in very rapid succession with the duration of the stimulus item relative to the mask increasing by a small amount with each successive presentation. On the basis of data from pilot studies, the sequence of displays was terminated at a time when the ratio of the item duration to the mask duration was such that the item could be identified a desired proportion of the time (20% to 80%). This is the CTI technique. The third type of display configuration introduced a brief mask prior to a DTI display and it will be called premask discrete threshold identification (Premask DTI).
For all types of trials the display began with the prompt READY presented across the center of the screen. When the ready signal was displayed, pushing either the yes or no button on the keypad would start the trial. When the button was pushed, the screen remained blank for 500 ms. Then the display for each technique followed.
In a DTI trial the blank interval was followed by a single presentation of the stimulus item and then the mask. The sum of the display durations for the stimulus and mask for the DTI trials was 100 ms. This is illustrated for a 60-ms stimulus duration in the left panel of Figure 1 .
In a CTI trial, the blank interval was followed by a series of item and mask presentations. Each individual presentation of an item and mask during one portion of a CTI trial is called a frame. The frames were a fixed 100-ms duration. The sequence of frames for a 60-ms stimulus duration in a CTI trial and the manner in which the content of the display varied with successive frames are shown in the middle panel of Figure 1 . The first frame consisted entirely of eight masks and served as a temporal and spatial warning signal. At the beginning of the second frame the stimulus item was presented for 2 ms and was immediately followed by masks that were displayed for the remaining 98 ms in the frame. In the third frame the item was displayed for 4 ms before it was masked, in the fourth frame it was displayed for 6 ms, and so on until the display was terminated at a predetermined frame. The duration measure of a CTI stimulus item is the final frame time (i.e., the duration of the final presentation of the item in a CTI trial).
In a Premask DTI trial, the blank interval was followed by a mask, then by a single presentation of the stimulus item and a following mask. The stimulus and the following mask totaled 100 ms in duration; the prior mask was 2 ms longer than the final mask. As can be seen in the right panel of Figure 1 , this procedure equated the masking characteristics of the Premask DTI items with those of the last frames of the CTI items.
The items were left-justified in the row of masks. Item lengths varied from three to eight letters. When the item was fewer than eight letters long, the remaining letter positions were filled with masks as shown in Figure 1 . Within the portion of the frame that was occupied only by masks, the five different masks were randomly placed in the eight letter positions with the restriction that any single mask was never used more than twice. Between frames these masks were randomly repositioned. A CTI display appeared as a rapidly flickering row of constantly changing dot masks out of which a letter string would gradually emerge.
The last item and mask frame in a trial was immediately followed by the appearance of a small question mark in the center of the screen, signaling the identification phase of the trial. Different experiments used either a selfscoring oral identification procedure or a typed identification procedure: When the question mark appeared, the subjects attempted to identify the item that had been presented either by saying it aloud or by typing it, depending on the procedure.
In the oral procedure, once the subjects made their identification response (or, if they had no guess as to what the item was) they pushed a key. After a delay of 500 ms, the item that had actually been presented was displayed for 500 ms, which allowed the subjects to score their accuracy by pushing the appropriate button on the keypad. The subjects were told to score themselves as correct only if their response was identical to the presented item; homophones and alternate spellings were not scoredas correct. Immediately after the self-scored accuracy response had been made, the ready signal for the next trial was displayed. The subjects were told that their responses were being recorded and that the recordings would be checked for accuracy at a later time. This procedure was adopted to ensure that the subsequent self-scoring of the identification errors would be accurate. The subjects were periodically checked to ensure that they were responding according to instructions. However, except for the fifth session of Experiment 2, the verbal responses were not, in fact, recorded. In the one session that was recorded, the overall error rate in self-scoring was about 5% for words and about 8% for pseudowords. In the typing procedure, subjects had one chance to correct any typing errors; then, after a 500-ms delay, they saw the displayed item for 500 ms. The ready signal for the next trial followed.
Experiment 1
One preliminary question that needed to be addressed prior to our primary experiments was whether the Lexicality X Task interaction observed by Feustel et al. (1983) might be due to masking differences between DTI and CTI rather than to factors related to codification.
The masking properties of visual displays can dramatically affect performance in a variety of experimental tasks, for example, identification (e.g., AUport, 1977; Johnston & McClelland, 1973; Massaro & Klitzke, 1979) , lexical decision (e.g., Fowler, Wolford, Slade, & Tassinary, 1981) , target detection (e.g., Marcel, 1983) , phonetic, graphemic, and semantic judgments (Fowler et al., 1981; Marcel, 1983) . In particular, the word superiority eifect, in which target letters are reported more accurately when they occur as part of a word than when they occur as part of a nonword or when they occur in isolation (e.g., Reicher, 1969; Wheeler, 1970) varies with masking characteristics of the display (Estes, Bjork, & Skaar, 1974) . The effect is larger with high-contrast displays with pattern masks, when compared with low-contrast displays with noise masks (Johnston & McClelland, 1973; Massaro & Klitzke, 1979) .
In the present case, part of the greater word advantage (over pseudowords) in the DTI task compared with the CTI task may be due to masking differences between the two tasks. The DTI task uses no mask prior to the single display presentation, but masks precede all frames in a CTI trial. To evaluate this possibility, the Premask DTI task was developed. Premask DTI has masking properties equivalent to the final exposure of the stimulus in a corresponding CTI trial, thereby allowing performance on all three tasks to be compared. Identification accuracy was measured for both words and pseudowords at their first and second presentations.
Method
Subjects.
Subjects were 38 students from Indiana University. They received course credit for their participation in a 45-min test session. Data from 2 subjects were discarded because they failed to follow instructions.
Stimuli. A set of 216 high-frequency words (70+ per million) were used to construct 108 critical word-pseudoword pairs and an additional 108 filler pairs.
Procedure. A session consisted of 360 trials of the oral self-scoring procedure of DTI, CTI, and Premask DTI, as described earlier. There were 36 experimental conditions: a 3 X 6 X 2 (Task X Frame Time X Lexicality) design. All conditions were mixed in a session. The frame times were 20, 32, 44, 56, 68, and 80 ms for DTI and CTI; 32, 44, 56, 68, 80 , and 96 ms for Premask DTI. Three critical items were assigned to each experimental condition for each subject, counterbalancing across subjects so that every item appeared in every condition (the first 20 trials consisted of filler items). Each critical item was presented twice in the session, separated by a random lag of between 10 and 30 intervening items. (Once-or twice-presented filler items, randomly assigned to conditions, filled out the trials for a session.) A subject saw half words and half pseudowords but never saw both a word and its matching pseudoword.
All subjects were given the same practice list, consisting of 6 trials of each task type, at the beginning of the session. The word-pseudoword pairs used for practice were derived from men's names.
Results and Discussion
Identification accuracy for new words and pseudowords in the three tasks is shown in Figure 2 . The points reflect the mean probability of correct identification in each experimental condition on the basis of 108 observations. The data from both first and second presentations in the three tasks are shown in Figure 3 .
The main results include the following: First, substantial performance enhancement is observed after a single repetition for both pseudowords and words. This was true in all tasks (see Figure 3) . Second, words are superior to pseudowords, but the effect is much smaller for the CTI task. Finally, premasks greatly lower the DTI performance, but the pattern of results remains the same; in particular, the large word-pseudoword difference (compared with the CTI task) persists when premasks are used. Statistical verification of these results was based on the following analysis. For each subject, the psychometric function for each experimental condition was fit by a cumulative (i.e., incomplete) beta function. The cumulative beta function is given in Equation 1:
where 0 < x < 1, and the parameters u and u > 0. This is an ogival function in the range from 0 to 1 based on a density with mean t)/ (u + v) and variance uv/ [(u + v) 2 (u + v + 1)]. It seems reasonable that at a frame time of 100 ms, accuracy would be at 1.0 because at this point there would be no mask. Similarly, at a frame time of 0 ms, accuracy should be zero. Therefore, if we treat the frame time in milliseconds as a percent in the interval (0, 1), the cumulative beta function should provide a good summary of our psychometric functions. As a summary statistic for overall accuracy, we define a threshold as the frame time at which the best-fitting function reaches 50% accuracy. The average Note. PDTI = premask discrete threshold identification; DTI = discrete threshold identification; CTI = continuous threshold identification.
thresholds for the data of Experiment 1 are given in Table 1 . Statistical analyses were performed on the thresholds for individual subjects' data. This procedure was adopted in all three experiments in view of obvious problems with direct comparisons of conditions where differences in performance levels exist. Unless otherwise indicated, all effects are significant beyond the p = .01 level.
An initial analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed main effects of lexicality, task, and presentations, F(l, 35) = 126.5, F(2, 70) = 154.40, and F[\, 35) = 173.62, respectively. In each task, words had lower thresholds than pseudowords: F(l, 35) = 67.54; F(\, 35) = 85.46; and F(l, 35) = 10.84, for Premask DTI, DTI, and CTI, respectively. In DTI and CTI, similar amounts of improvement were seen with a repetition for both words and pseudowords-the Lexicality X Presentations interactions were F(l, 35) = 2.00, p > .16, and F(l, 35) < 1.0, p > .36, for DTI and CTI, respectively. The Lexicality X Presentations interaction was marginally significant for the Premask DTI task, F(l, 35) = 4.48, p < .05, possibly because of the overall difficulty of that task.
Of primary interest were the comparisons between CTI and each of the discrete tasks for new items (see Figure 2 ). Significant Lexicality X Task interactions persisted between CTI and DTI, as found in the Feustel et al. (1983) study, and between the maskequated CTI and Premask DTI, F(\, 35) = 26.57, and F(\, 35) = 4.74, p = .036: The word advantage was greater in both DTI and Premask DTI than it was in CTI (a result unchanged by analysis of the CTI data in terms of total stimulus duration rather than final frame time). It is always problematic to compare sizes of differences when the levels of performance differ. However, by looking at Figures 2 or 3, it can be seen that the word-pseudoword difference is larger in DTI, both when the performance level in DTI is about equal to or higher than in CTI, or much lower than in CTI (i.e., the Premask DTI). Thus the interaction in the data is not determined by the level of performance.
These results suggest that masking differences between the CTI and DTI tasks cannot alone account for the Lexicality X Task interaction found by Feustel et al. (1983) and replicated here. Even when the perceptual quality of a single brief display of a letter string is degraded by the introduction of a premask (in Premask DTI), a large word advantage in identification accuracy persists. We propose that the presence of cohesive response units in memory is one important factor causing words to be identified faster and more accurately than pseudowords in both DTI and Premask DTI (and to a lesser degree in CTI).
The fact that in both DTI and CTI a repetition causes substantial facilitation for words and pseudowords suggests that the facilitation may be due to factors not requiring stored lexical codes: Presumably, pseudowords do not possess lexical codes. Instead, the facilitation may be caused by the action of stored, episodic images of the first presentation. In Experiments 2 and 3, we explore the facilitating effects of repetition, the development of codes for pseudowords, and the acquisition and retention characteristics of the processes underlying such effects.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we used both CTI and DTI to obtain psychometric functions for words and pseudowords presented as many as 30 times. Thirty repetitions should improve performance for all items dramatically, and if codification occurs for repeated pseudowords, these items might show even greater improvement, perhaps reaching the perfor-mance levels of words repeated the same number of times. In order to examine temporal characteristics of these effects, we repeated some items three times each day and some once each day.
Method
Subjects. Ten paid subjects from the student population at Indiana University were tested.
Stimuli and design. A set of 552 medium-to-high frequency words (55+ per million) were used to construct 128 critical word-pseudoword pairs and 424 filler pairs. Five independent variables were manipulated in a withinsubjects design: lexicality (word vs. pseudoword), task (DTI vs. CTI), frame time, presentation schedule (nonvarying vs. varying; see below), and number of presentations.
Four frame times were chosen that would yield between 20% and 80% identification accuracy for each Lexicality X Task condition on the first presentation. The initial frame times for DTI words were 20, 28, 36, and 44 ms; for CTI words, 28, 36, 44, and 52 ms; for DTI pseudowords, 28, 44, 60, and 76 ms; and for CTI pseudowords, 36, 44, 52, and 60 ms. In session four, faster frame times were introduced as performance approached ceiling (except for one very good subject who received the faster times in session 2). The new durations for DTI words were 4, 12, 20, and 28 ms; for CTI words, 12, 20, 28, and 36 ms; for DTI pseudowords, 12, 28, 44, and 60 ms; and for CTI pseudowords, 20, 28, 36, and 44 ms. In total, there were ten sessions.
Half of the critical items were presented in a varying schedule: A varying item (word or pseudoword) was one that was randomly assigned to a Frame Time X Task condition on each repetition. On the average, a varying item appeared 2.05 times (at uncontrolled lags) during a session. The remaining half of the critical items was presented according to a nonvarying presentation schedule: A nonvarying item was one presented at a single frame time in a single condition (DTI or CTI) across repetitions (except for the lowering of frame times after Session 3). Half of the nonvarying critical items occurred once per session, and the other half occurred three times per session. The between-item lag for three-per-session items was varied pseudorandomly between 5 and 25 intervening items. Assignment of critical word-pseudoword pairs to the Lexicality X Task X Presentation Schedule conditions was counterbalanced across subjects for the first eight subjects. The additional two subjects were treated as replications of the first two.
Some filler items were presented either once or twice during the course of ten sessions; other fillers were presented either once or twice for five consecutive sessions. The fillers were presented only at the two fastest frame times and were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions each session. Each session began with a 20-trial primacy buffer of unique filler items. All other aspects of the design were either randomized, permuted, or counterbalanced.
Procedure. Subjects participated in the 10 sessions over 12 days, with 340 trials per session. In each session, an equal number of DTI and CTI trials was presented in a mixed list composed of half words and half pseudowords. A subject never saw a word and its matching pseudoword in the course of the 10 sessions. The oral self-scoring procedure described in the General Method was used.
All subjects saw the same practice list before their first experimental session. The practice list contained 20 trials of words and pseudowords based on country names. The frame times for the practice list items were 40 and 50 ms used equally often in each of the tasks.
Results and Discussion
The mean probabilities of correct identification for each experimental condition were computed for each subject. These data were then averaged to yield group psychometric functions. Cumulative beta functions were fit to the psychometric data for individual subjects (see Experiment 1), and statistical analyses were performed on the individual thresholds derived from the functions. Reported differences are significant beyond the p = .01 level, unless otherwise indicated.
Because only slight differences between items in the nonvarying and varying presentation schedules were observed, and because the thresholds from the first 10 presentations were not significantly different, F(\, 9) = 4.48, p > .06, the accuracy data were collapsed over nonvarying and varying items. The resultant psychometric functions averaged over subjects are shown in Figure 4 for the first six presentations of words and pseudowords in DTI and CTI. Figure 5 shows the later presentations collapsed over presentations 7-9, 10-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-24, and 25-30 . This was done to maintain 80-120 observations per each symbol.
Three trends are apparent in Figures 4 and 5. First, identification improves with repetitions for each condition: The psychometric functions shift upward and leftward. Second, by approximately the sixth presentation word and pseudoword functions appear to have converged; this is the case for both DTI and CTI tasks. Third, for the DTI task, this convergence involves an increase in the slope of the pseudoword function as well as an overall improvement. These trends suggest the action of two different factors (a) facilitation from repetitions that occurs for all items and (b) an additional facilitation that occurs for pseudowords. spectively. All two-way interactions were significant. For each task, tests of simple effects were carried out on the first 10 presentations to determine when word-pseudoword convergence had occurred. Then, linear regression analyses were performed on the data in each task after convergence. By the fifth presentation, word and pseudoword thresholds are no longer significantly different, F(l, 9) = 2.91, p > .12 for DTI and F(l, 9) = 2.84, p > .12 for CTI. After convergence, DTI remains superior to CTI, f{l, 9) = 90.45, and repetitions continue to cause improvement thereafter for all Task X Lexicality conditions, F{1, 258) = 7.92, 33.89, 21.44, and 60.54 for DTI words, DTI pseudowords, CTI words, and CTI pseudowords, respectively. The convergence result was further tested for each task with a sign test (Hays, 1981, p. 581 ) that directly compared accuracy for words and pseudowords at overlapping frame times, z = .725, p > .23, and 2 = .533, p > .29, for DTI and CTI, respectively. These statistical results confirm those observed in the group data above. 1 It may be that improvement in performance over repetitions is an overestimation of the repetition effect, because the effects of general task learning have not been removed. However, such general task learning can be assessed by examining the identification of new (unique filler) items in each session. No improvement with sessions was observed in a linear regression analysis, F(l, 98) < 1.0, p > .37. Thus, task learning plays at most a small role in the improvement seen with repetitions. Most of the improvement can safely be attributed to a combination of repetition and the codification of repeated pseudowords.
Consider next the effects of delays and test spacings. The nonvarying critical items were divided into two groups: the half that were always seen once per session and the half that were seen three times per session. We wished to compare the repetition effect and the wordpseudoword convergence for these groups. The mean thresholds over individual subjects ' Figures 4 and 5 show that for group data, DTI pseudoword psychometric curves increased in slope with repetitions. The slope of the cumulative beta function, however, distorts as the boundaries 0 and 1 are approached. This precludes analysis of the slope data from best-fitting functions to individual data. For the conditions where similar thresholds were observed, however, it was possible to compare the slopes. An informal examination showed that when thresholds were similar for DTI words and pseudowords at different presentations (during the first 10 presentations), the word functions had steeper slopes than the pseudoword functions. Figure 6 and show that the convergence of words and pseudowords occurs for both the 3-per-session and the 1-per-session items. After convergence, repetitions still improve identification accuracy for 1-and 3-per-session items in both DTI and CTI. Binomial sign tests (Hays, 1981, p. 582) on individual accuracy data were used to compare performance on presentations 5-7 versus presen- For the 1-per-session items, 4 subjects showed significant improvement in later sessions, (p < .05), another 4 subjects showed nonsignificant trends suggesting slight improvement (.10 < p < .25), and 2 subjects showed no improvement. The results for the 3-per-session items are more straightforward: Nine out of 10 subjects were more accurate in the later presentations (p < .04); for the tenth subject, a nonsignificant trend was observed (p > .16). These comparisons confirm the earlier ones; repetition effects continue even after word-pseudoword differences have disappeared.
It appears as if repetitions, rather than sessions, is the main factor determining improvement in performance (although there are within-and between-session effects that will be dicussed shortly). Figure 9 shows the average identification accuracy for a subset of frame times (collapsed over lexicality and tasks) that were retained over the ten sessions. The 3-per-session and 1-per-session nonvarying items are compared as a function of presentations and sessions in the left-hand and right-hand panels, respectively, of Figure  9 . (For each subject, different items contributed to the 3-per-session curve after Session 3, and to the 1-per-session curve after Session 5, but the average data reflect the same items for each plotted symbol.) The two curves overlap more when compared by number of presentations. Thus, it seems that the number of presentations, rather than the spacing of repetitions, is the primary determinant of improvement in performance.
Of course, in both panels of Figure 9 it can be seen that for the 3-per-session items there is a substantial decrease in performance between the end of one session and the beginning of the next. Sign tests (Hays, 1981, p. 581) for individual subjects' data between the last presentation in one session and the first presentation in the next session collapsed over all the 3-per-session conditions were significant beyond the p < .03 level for all 10 subjects, indicating that "forgetting" occurred between sessions. For words, significant sign tests were found for 7 subjects (p < .05), and for pseudowords, significant sign tests were found for 6 subjects (p < .03). Nonsignificant trends were observed for the remaining subjects (.06 < p < .09). This result suggests that between-session forgetting occurred equally for both words and pseudowords.
The 3-per-session items had pseudorandom lags of 5-25 items during a session. If episodic memory processes underlie either the improvement seen with repetitions or the decrement between sessions, then some memory loss with longer lags might be expected. A split-half analysis divided items into short (5-12) and long (13-25) lag groups for the lag between first and second presentations in each session. A sign test on these group data over all thrice-per-session conditions failed to find evidence for within-sessions lag effects, z < 1.0, p > .56). This failure to find significant memory loss for repetitions at longer lags within a test session was not unexpected (Feustel et al., 1983, Experiment 1; Jacoby, 1983a; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Scarborough et al., 1977) . (In Experiment 5 of the Feustel et al., 1983 , studies, however, small lag effects were seen when a slightly different threshold identification task and a wider range of lags were used.)
Presumably the effect of a repetition within a session outweighs whatever small lag effects may exist, so that repetitions within a session improve performance at all lags. The forgetting between sessions, however, is large enough to outweigh the beneficial effects of a repetition in the prior session, producing a net loss. It is interesting to note that forgetting between sessions is not sufficient to overcome the repetitions effect for the 1-per-session items. There are a number of possible explanations of these findings, some paralleling those in the literature on spacing effects (e.g., Hintzman, 1974 , and the storage strength hypothesis presented as part of the simulation model later in this paper).
The main result from these data is obvious: the repetition effect is not very sensitive to lags within sessions, but is susceptible to decay between sessions. This is true for both common words and for repeated pseudowords. It may be possible to account for the forgetting if repetition benefits are due to facilitation caused by access to stored episodic images and if this access is dependent on context shifts (which are greater between sessions than within sessions).
The observation of performance decrements between sessions suggested testing at more extended delays. In Experiment 3, eight of the ten subjects were retested with the same stimuli as well as with new words and pseudowords following a delay of one year. Our goal was to investigate the long-term effects of repetition and the codification of pseudowords. We posed two questions: First, will the repetition effect decay completely, or will there be a residual advantage from the multiple presentations in Experiment 2? Second, how permanent is the change in pseudoword identification that we interpreted as codification?
Experiment 3
Almost one year after the beginning of Experiment 2, eight of the ten subjects who participated in Experiment 2 again performed the DTI and CTI tasks. An additional recognition task, with new and old words and pseudowords, was also performed. Two comparisons are of primary interest: first, old words versus old pseudowords, which should provide evidence concerning the retention of codification; and, second, new words versus old words, which should provide evidence concerning the retention of gains due to multiple repetitions in Experiment 2. The recognition data were collected to study the relation of this traditional measure of episodic memory to the measures obtained in the threshold identification tasks.
Method
Subjects.
Eight subjects who had participated in Experiment 2 performed in two 90-min sessions on consecutive days between 348 and 360 days after the first session of Experiment 2.
2 Together, the group of eight had constituted one complete permutation of critical items to experimental conditions in Experiment 2. Stimuli and procedure. The critical "old" stimulus items were the 64 words and 64 (nonmatching) pseudowords that each subject saw repeatedly in Experiment 2. In that study, each old item had occurred between 10 and 30 times, in either a varying or nonvarying presentation schedule. In the present study, the previous assignments to experimental conditions were not preserved. The set of critical "new" items consisted of a random selection from each of the 256 word and pseudoword filler pairs that had been presented only once in Experiment 2. Thus, roughly half of the new items in the present experiment had been seen once in the original training session, whereas the other half had not been seen. Performance did not differ between these types of items (post hoc tests confirmed that this was the case), so all these items may be considered new.
The set of critical items was randomly halved, and each half was presented in one of the two experimental sessions; the construction of each session list was identical.
1 Following Experiment 2, the subjects participated in two studies at 3-and 4-week delays, respectively. The first of these studies was in essence a 4-session continuation of Experiment 2, but the data were lost due to computer malfunction. The second study used different items and addressed a different topic. is instrumental to the comparisons we are making: The difference between old words and new words will provide a measure of any facilitation resulting from the presentations within Experiment 2 (i.e., the between-experiment repetition effect). The difference between old words and old pseudowords will provide a measure of the permanence of the codes formed for the pseudowords that were repeated in Experiment 2. Each experimental trial consisted of the stimulus display and the typed identification response phases described in the General Method section. On the first presentations of critical items in each session, subjects also performed a third recognition phase of the experimental trial. Here, subjects attempted to recognize the words and pseudowords that had been seen repeatedly one year earlier by making an appropriate binary (old/new) response.
A 40-trial practice list contained words and pseudowords based on personal names shown at frame times of 28 and 44 ms in both tasks. Recognition judgments (requiring new responses) were made on 18 trials, randomly interspersed in the practice list.
Results and Discussion
An initial ANOVA on the identification accuracy data showed that performance improved between the two experimental sessions, f(l, 7) = 22.31, suggesting the presence of a warm-up effect (overall accuracy was .224 and .315 on Day 1 and Day 2, respectively). Because the pattern of results was similar on the two days, individual subject data for each experimental condition were collapsed across sessions. Because the identification probabilities were at floor levels (about 0.0) for frame times of 10 ms for all conditions, data from this frame time were eliminated from the following analyses. The group psychometric functions for first presentations of DTI and CTI items are shown in Figure 10 , and the group threshold data for all three presentations are given in Table 2 . Statistical analyses were performed on the individual thresholds. Note. DTI = discrete threshold identification; CTI -continuous threshold identification.
All reported statistical tests are significant beyond the p= .01 level, unless otherwise stated. An overall ANOVA yielded a main effect of repetitions (within the experimental session), F(2, 14) = 96.87, and significant Presentations X Training (i.e., old vs. new items) and Presentations X Lexicality X Training interactions, F(l, 7) = 21.90 andF(2, 14) = 13.56, respectively. Thresholds decreased with repetitions for all items, but by the third presentation, the difference in performance between new and old pseudowords has already begun to decrease. The Presentations X Lexicality interaction was not significant, F(2, 14) = 2.92, p > .08, suggesting that comparable amounts of facilitation occurred for new and old words and old pseudowords.
In both tasks, old words and old pseudowords were identified equally accurately, F(\, 1) < 1.0, p > .49, F(l, 7) = 3.47, p > .10, for DTI and CTI, respectively. The simplest interpretation of this would be that codification has occurred and the pseudoword codes are still accessible after one year.
No differences were observed between performance on new and old words, F(l, 7) < 1.0, p > .47 and F(l, 7) < 1.0, p > .85 for DTI and CTI, respectively. The result shows that the facilitation due to word repetitions within Experiment 2 had decayed over the course of one year. It seems likely that repetition gains for repeated pseudowords have also been lost during this delay, but a direct verification is not possible because codification causes old pseudowords to be identified better than new pseudowords.
Additional evidence for the codification of old pseudowords comes from the error data collected in Experiment 3. Incorrect identification responses were categorized as either nonresponses, transpositions (scrambled strings of the correct letters, e.g., ACT for CAT), or intrusions (where the response included at least one letter foreign to the stimulus item, e.g., COT for CAT). Overall, most identification errors were intrusions, F[2, 14) = 87.43 (because subjects were encouraged to give some response, if at all possible); the number of nonresponses and transpositions did not differ significantly, F(l, 7) < 1.0, p > .68. However, more nonresponses than transpositions occurred in CTI, F(l, An ANOVA of the DTI intrusions found main effects of lexicality and training, f{l, 7) = 35.19 and P(l, 7) = 7.87, p < .03, as well as a significant interaction, F(l, 7) = 7.77, p < .03. Post hoc tests confirmed that significantly more intrusions occurred for new pseudowords than for new words, old words, or old pseudowords, F(l, 7) = 36.77. This result suggests that the letters in new pseudoword strings may have been identified more independently than in the other stimulus items, consistent with our interpretation that new pseudowords are uncodified. (Overall, 25% of intrusion responses had occurred at least once previously during Experiment 3. When these are broken down, no differences between words and pseudowords were found, F(\, 7) = 1.56, p > .25, but more of them were old items from Experiment 2 than new items, F(\, 7) = 20.88. This effect did not interact with any of the experimentally manipulated variables).
The recognition data collected in Experiment 3 are shown as mean hit rates, mean false alarm rates, and d' measures for words and pseudowords in Table 3 .
Words were recognized as having occurred in the earlier experiments significantly above chance after a test delay of one year, t(7) = 4.67. In addition, pseudowords were recognized significantly better than words, t(7) = 4.46. It is interesting that above-chance recognition for words occurs even when repetition effects in identification have disappeared. Even though both repetition effects and rec-ognition may depend on the storage of episodic images, the dependence on and/or the use of the episodic information is apparently not identical in the two cases.
General Discussion
The major findings of Experiments 2 and 3 follow. After approximately six repetitions in two threshold identification tasks, the initial advantage of words over pseudowords disappears. Although the words and pseudowords have converged, performance continues to improve in both tasks with further repetitions. For the items that were repeated three times within the daily sessions, small performance decrements occur between sessions. After a delay of one year, the previously repeated pseudowords are identified as accurately as the previously repeated words, but performance has dropped to the level of new words. In addition, after the one-year delay, recognition memory for the pseudowords is superior to that for the words.
The results suggest five conclusions. First, with repetition, pseudowords become codified and, hence, gain wordlike properties in the identification tasks. Second, codification is retained, to a large extent, even one year later. Third, the repetition effect is partly independent of codification. Fourth, repetition effects depend on recent, episodic memory traces. Fifth, the utilization of episodic memory is different for identification and recognition memory.
In the remainder of this article we consider possible models of codification in identification, outline our favored model, and consider an instantiation of the model for the DTI task in more detail. Also, we present a brief discussion of alternative accounts of repetition effects and the recognition data from Experiment 3. Finally, we contemplate the implications of our data for established accounts of word identification.
Codification
We begin by assuming that words have a memory code and pseudowords do not, a reasonable assumption given the superior identification of words compared to pseudowords. In principle, a code could improve identification from partial or degraded input information for at least three reasons: First, the code could provide "top-down" feedback in letter identification, which in turn could improve code identification (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981) . Second, the code could itself become active and available, providing a name, in what may be a parallel and automatic process. Such a process would make relatively complete use of the encoded features. Third, without such a "name," the features themselves would have to be retained and used, and during the time that some features are being utilized by construct a response, others might be lost from memory (e.g., Earhard & Fullerton, 1969; Feustel et al., 1983) . These are closely related hypotheses and all may play a role in explaining the advantage of words over pseudowords. The retention hypothesis (i.e., the third of these) can help explain the difference in the magnitude of the word advantage between the DTI and CTI tasks: In CTI, features forgotten after one frame can be recovered in the next. This recovery could raise performance relative to DTI (as Experiment 1 showed when masking in DTI and CTI was equivalent) and help pseudowords approach the performance of words by making it more probable that all encoded features are used in the process of constructing a response. It is somewhat less clear how top-down support (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) or the mere existence of codes could explain this task interaction.
Whatever the basis of the word advantage, it seems likely that the presence of a unitized or cohesive memory code is a crucial factor. Thus, when repetitions of pseudowords cause performance to be equal to that of words that have been repeated the same number of times, it seems plausible that the pseudowords have become codified. Furthermore, the pseudoword code apparently becomes equal in "strength" to the word code, or a residual word advantage would have been seen. The observed equality is unlikely to be due to a ceiling effect, with words reaching ceiling sooner than pseudowords, because performance is improved by repetitions even after word and pseudoword performance has converged. The equality of codes for words and pseudowords is further supported by the equality of performance at delays of a year-an equality that persists even when overall performance has decreased for both types of items and the repetition effect has apparently disappeared. We admit that the equality at one year could be an accident. That is, word repetition benefits have decayed to zero, but pseudoword benefits could have decayed only partially over the year, just enough to produce the equal performance. Coincidences are always possible, but a more plausible view is that codes of roughly "equal strength" have been produced for words and pseudowords.
If we accept the existence of codification, then what is a code and how does it develop? It seems simplest to suppose that a code is an entity that emerges from an amalgamation of separate episodic images of various presentations of an item (Brooks, 1977; Jacoby, 1983a ). Yet our data suggest that the code must be a distinct entity and not just a composite of separate images. If a code were simply a composite, then five or six presentations could not cause words and pseudowords to converge because their total frequency of occurrence, both in and out of the laboratory, would be very different. The simple composite approach also has trouble dealing with the retention of codification in the face of loss of repetition benefits. We are aware of the Hintzman and Ludlam (1980) model, in which an exemplar-based system seems to produce better retention of a "prototype," but we have doubts that a similar system could handle the present pattern of results. Our distinction between codes and episodes does not necessarily imply separate . storage representation; all the information from all episodes and codes for an item might be part of a single large grouping in memory, but the different types of information might then be accessed in different ways. For example, McClelland & Rumelhart (in press) suggest that the accessibility of the relational information associated with episodes may be distinct from the accessibility of the contextual information of the episodes; in this view, it might be the relation among the episodes that constitutes what we call the code. Regardless of the storage mechanism, some entity that is at least partially distinct from individual episodes seems to be retained over the long term.
It may be profitable to view codification in terms of automatization. Whatever the nature of the representation in memory, the existence of a code may make it possible that a unitary identification response occurs automatically (see Schneider & Shiflrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) . When input conditions are degraded, the automatic response would occur only on a portion of the trials. On the remaining trials, a control process presumably constructs an identification response via an hierarchical analyticperceptual pathway (e.g., Feustel et al., 1983; LaBerge & Samuels, 1974) .
Assuming that repetition benefits have decayed at the one-year test and that codes exist for both old pseudowords and words, it is still not obvious that performance levels should be equal. For example, within the class of words, performance levels differ with factors like natural word frequency (e.g., Morton, 1969; Scarborough et al., 1977; Solomon & Postman, 1952) . Thus the base, or asymptotic, levels of identification accuracy for both words and pseudowords can be expected to vary as a function of many factors. Why then do our pseudowords happen to produce performance levels equal to our words? The most likely answer lies in our pseudoword construction process-one letter was altered in a high-frequency word. If much of the variance in pseudoword (and word) performance is accounted for by letter choices and arrangements (rather than higherlevel characteristics of the holistic string), then the observed equality in performance at one year would be understandable. If this hypothesis is correct it has the interesting implication that at least some natural language word frequency effects may not be due entirely to frequency of occurrence, but may reflect differential structural properties, both graphemic and phonotactic, at different frequencies (e.g., Earhard, 1968; Eukel, 1980; Landauer & Streeter, 1973) . If this argument is correct, why do the words not show an advantage due to their occurrence in natural language in the days and weeks prior to the final test session? Perhaps the context of those occurrences is different enough from the test context that no facilitation is seen.
Repetition Effects
Aside from codification, repetition produces temporary facilitation even when codes already exist (e.g., for words). This facilitation, or the repetition effect, is in our view most likely a result of benefits from episodic images and not directly a result of alterations in strength or responsivity of word and pseudoword codes. The observation of substantial initial repetition benefits in both DTI and CTI for words that have codes and pseudowords that do not (Experiments 1 & 2) is the basis for this judgment. However, there are many ways to formulate a model using codes and episodes, and it is by no means trivial to intuit predictions for these types of models. We shall therefore present a prototype model of the kind suggested, deriving predictions from a computer simulation, before discussing alternative models.
A Proposed Model of Identification
In the model we regard as most plausible, stored episodic images and higher level codes enhance letter identification by means of topdown feedback. This is illustrated in Figure 11 .
When an item is presented, features and/ or letters begin to be encoded and transmit information to the word or pseudoword code and to whatever episodic images exist. The appropriate codes begin to become active and to provide feedback to the lower levels of processing. As a result, the responses of features that match the most active higher level codes are sharpened. These feedback and feed-forward processes continue interactively, subject to any damping mechanisms that may exist in the system. The end result is that the letters and/or features are better perceived when episodic images or word/ pseudoword codes exist in memory. Also, episodic images will activate word or pseudoword codes indirectly, through the enhancement of lower level features.
In our model, the word advantage over novel pseudowords is not only due to better encoding of letters and features, but is also due to an inefficiency in using encoded pseudoword features. Novel pseudowords must be constructed by using control processes from features and letters. This would be a slow and inefficient process in comparison with the automatic activation of a code and explains part of the word-pseudoword difference and the smaller difference in the CTI task r Figure 11 . Schematic diagram of the proposed interaction between permanent memory codes, episodic memory images, and lower-level codes for letters and/or features, in word or pseudoword identification tasks.
(because we assume that features lost after one frame can be recovered in the next).
We wish to argue that for episodic images to facilitate identification, it is necessary that appropriate context cues be used to probe memory. (This is illustrated by the plus sign in Figure 11 .) Thus, when context cues are unavailable-for tests across sessions or over the course of a year in our studies-then facilitation will decrease or even disappear (e.g., Jacoby, 1983a, Experiments 2 and 4; Jacoby, 1983b; Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Kolers, 1976; Kolers & Magee, 1978 ; but see also Jacoby, 1983a, Experiment 3).
Our proposed model is similar to one proposed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) but adds another kind of memory representation, temporarily accessible episodic images, to the higher level of the system. In the present approach, both the permanent codes and the episodic images interact with the lower levels of the processing system. A possible problem for this model would involve nonlinear interactions. Episodic images would improve both word and pseudoword identification due to letter enhancement, and the permanent codes would give an additional benefit to words, but these effects might not be additive in an interactive system. Whether a model like this could explain the data would depend on the details of the quantitative instantiation. We turn next to such an instantiation.
A model for discrete threshold identification. Our model borrows elements from McClelland and Rumelhart (1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) and Dosher (1984) . We apply it only to DTI for simplicity; although a version could certainly be applied to CTI, we leave such application for future work, because the CTI task is considerably more complex to model.
The model we have in mind is related to that of McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) , but a number of simplifications are made in light of the limited aims of the present theoretical exploration.
1. Memory nodes. These are permanent nodes corresponding to (a) letters, (b) words, (c) pseudowords after sufficient presentations, (d) episodic images of each presentation of a word or pseudoword. Although the episodic images may be permanent, the inevitable changes in context that occur over time make these images less and less accessible, and hence eifectively temporary, 2. Learning of codes. Each presentation of a pseudoword increases the probability that a permanent code will be formed. We assume that the codification process is based on an accumulation of information over presentations so that the probability of code formation rises sharply as the number of presentations increases. In particular, we assume that the probability that a code exists just prior to presentation k, based on the parameter e, is as follows:' (2) 3. Activation of nodes. When a stimulus occurs, the letter nodes gradually increase in activation and begin to activate any word or pseudoword codes, or episodic images that exist. As these higher level nodes, if any, become activated, they in turn provide feedback to the letter nodes, further increasing their activation. The activation of higher level nodes (episodic, word, and pseudoword) decays continuously, so a decrease in bottomup activation from the letters allows the net activation of these nodes to drop. Letter nodes do not decay as long as the physical stimulus is present. However, when the mask replaces the stimulus, we assume letter nodes begin to decay. These assumptions are instantiated as follows:
Let A(t), B(t), and C(t) represent the activation at time t of letter nodes, codes (words or pseudowords), and episodic images, respectively. Our simulation will operate in units of time, «. Then, when the test stimulus is physically present, we have the following:
, (3) and when the stimulus is not physically present
In these equations, \ A is the parameter giving the rate of growth of letter activation caused by the stimulus. The parameter r is the remembering factor; what proportion of activation is retained from one time unit to the next. F e (t) represents the feedback at time t from the word or pseudoword code, if any, and F c (t) represents the feedback at time t from the various episodic images, if any. The activations for codes and episodes are given by the following equations:
and
In these equations, \ AS and \ A c are parameters governing the rate of growth of activation of higher level codes (if any) caused by the current letter activation level. The activation level for episodic nodes C can be thought of as a normalized level regardless of the strength or contextual shift associated with any particular episodic node. These decay factors are incorporated in the term F c (t), as indicated in Equation 8.
F B (t) = B(t)\ BA . (7)
In Equation 7, \ BA determines the feedback to letters caused by the current activa-tion level of the word or pseudoword code (if any).
For items presented just once per day, we assume that there is a context shift between each day and the next, reducing the feedback from any episodic node by a factor of 0 for every day of age of that node. Thus, for presentation n
FC(t) = C(t)\CA
:(l-0"-').
The terms on the right containing 0 represent the summed contributions of all episodes.
For the 3-per-day items, we assume that each presentation after the first in the same context (i.e., on the same day) is stored with a strength a less than that for the preceding presentation of that same item. Presumably, the lower strength reflects less attention given to an item that is familiar in the current context. Thus, for the 3-per-day items, for presentation n on day (m + 1) we have the following: In Equations 8 and 9, \ CA is a parameter determining the degree of the feedback from episodic nodes to letter nodes. The terms in brackets represent the summed contributions of all episodes.
4. Node identification. There are many ways to convert the activation functions into identification probabilities. In the present model, we are concerned only with the identification probabilities for (a) letters and (b) word or pseudoword codes. For our purposes, we can adopt a much simpler approach than that used by McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) , ignoring the activation of competitors and neglecting to use areas under the activation functions. Instead, we simply take the maximum value of activation and convert it by a monotonically increasing function into an identification probability.
In Equations 10 and 1 1, A mKl and B max are the maximum activation levels of letter nodes and codes. Note that all letters share the same activation functions and the same maximum, but each has a separately calculated probability of identification. To parameters "(A, "Ys, U A , and ta B determine the nature of the transformation of the function relating maximum activation to presentation time, to the S-shaped function relating identification probability to presentation time.
5. Response rules. If a word or pseudoword code is identified, then a correct response is made. If not, then a process of response construction from letters must take place. The construction process requires that (a) all letters must be identified and (b) all the letters that are identified must remain in short-term memory until the construction process uses them. The probability of memory retention is S. We assume in the simulation that there are four letters in each stimulus. Then the probability of correct identification via the construction route in any condition is just //{, and the probability of correct identification from a code, if one exists, is 1 B . This leads to the following key expressions: In view of the number of parameters in this model, we have not attempted to find a best-fitting parameter set. Instead, we have chosen parameter values after an extremely brief exploration of the parameter space that produce predictions qualitatively in accord with the observed data. For the purposes of the simulations, we set it equal to 1 ms The nature of the model is somewhat easier to ascertain through perusal of Figure  12 . In this figure, certain activation functions are given for letters, codes, and episodes, for the parameter values listed earlier. The maximum values are also given in the panels. Functions are shown for items with and without codes, for the first and the fourth presentations of 1-per-session items at frame times of 20 ms and 40 ms. As expected, the maxima are higher when a code is present, when the frame time is longer, and for later presentations.
Predicted psychometric functions corresponding to Figures 4 and 5 are shown in Figure 13 . A comparison of the predicted thresholds for the 3-per-session items and the 1-per-session items, corresponding to Figure  7 , is shown in Figure 14 . Finally, predicted functions for the one-year test, corresponding to the left panel of Figure 10 , are shown in Figure 15 . Qualitatively, the predictions accord well with the data: (a) The shape of the psychometric functions and the relation of word to pseudoword functions; (b) the improvements with repetitions; (c) the convergence of words and pseudowords; (d) the continued improvements with repetitions after convergence; (e) the scalloped effect seen in the 3-per-session data; (f) the relation between the items presented once and three times per session; and (g) the findings at the one-year delay.
One could argue with some justification that our model has a large number of parameters, making the qualitative match of predictions to data less impressive. We agree that a good deal of additional research as well as further elaboration of the model are needed. The present simulation provides a demon- stration that the type of model depicted in Figure 11 can produce the observed patterns of data. The model in principle could be applied to the CTI data, but that situation is quite a bit more complex, and the model would require considerable elaboration. We have chosen to defer that sort of elaboration. It is
ca O FRAME TIME (MS) Figure 15 . Predicted probability of identification as a function of frame time (in milliseconds) for first presentations of discrete threshold identification (DTI) items in Experiment 3.
considerably easier to apply the model to the Premask DTI data. It seems most natural to simulate that situation by either (a) assuming the presentation time is effectively less with a premask or (b) assuming the parameter Xî s less with a premask. We have examined these possibilities and both seem capable of predicting patterns like those in the data, but the details are omitted.
Alternative Models
In one alternative model, codification develops gradually: A code forms with some probability on each pseudoword presentation. Once a code exists, performance is equal to the initial word performance. The repetition effect observed for pseudowords is thus due to a mixture of poor performance levels for uncoded items and good levels for coded items. Then, as codification proceeds, a greater proportion of responses is based on codes, improving overall performance. In addition, for all coded items, repetitions will lower thresholds (perhaps by temporary, but long-term activation of codes). In this model it is an accident that threshold lowering for a word repetition produces benefits equal to those produced by partial codification following a pseudoword presentation. Also, in this model it is hard to see why convergence of performance should occur after a small number of repetitions of words and pseudowords.
In another alternative model, a code is always formed on the first presentation of a pseudoword, with the threshold set to a level necessary to produce the observed repetition benefits. In this model it is also difficult to explain the rapid convergence of words and pseudowords.
In an alternate set of models, repetition benefits are produced by episodic images stored in memory from previous presentations, for both words and pseudowords (e.g., Feustel et al., 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Brooks, 1984) . These episodic images could then facilitate identification either directly or indirectly. If the episodic images are themselves directly activated by a presentation (e.g., Jacoby, 1983a) , and if the episodic images for words and pseudowords have equal thresholds, there would be a larger improvement for pseudowords than words, because the pseudowords have lower initial performance levels. Furthermore, such a model would seem to imply a strong link between identification and recognition memory, but such links are very weak at best (e.g., Feustel et al., 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982) . Alternatively, the episodic images of pseudowords might have higher thresholds than those of words, but then it is difficult to see how words and pseudowords would converge in performance.
Such logic suggests that episodic images produce benefits indirectly, through threshold lowering of words and pseudoword codes, or through facilitation of letter and/or feature encoding. If episodic images change threshold levels for codes, then we have essentially the same model as that in which repetitions directly cause threshold changes. The same problem arises: Convergence of performance for words and pseudowords is difficult to explain.
We note that McClelland and Rumelhart (in press) predict our convergence data in Experiment 2 with their distributed memory model. In that model, codification is an emergent behavioral consequence of superimposed memory traces laid down on presentations of words and pseudowords. Although this view of memory is episodic in some sense, the structured relations in the representations of similar episodes that characterize the model are not typical of episodic memory models. We have no objection to McClelland and Rumelhart's (in press) interpretation of codification. Indeed, it is compatible with our notion of a code as functionally discrete from the episodes related to it. We await further developments of this model, in particular attempts to account for the improvement after convergence in Experiment 2 and the one year maintenance of codification accompanied by the loss of repetition benefits.
Thus, we feel that models that rely only on temporary changes in code responsivity, or only on the action of memory episodes, cannot be ruled out but would have certain problems in accounting for our data. We judge that such models, if fit to our data, might appear inelegant or ad hoc, but the force of such arguments should not be overrated. Intuitive predictions are notoriously unreliable, and we would like to see simulations of alternative models. Then one could properly determine whether the increase in complexity caused by our assumption that repetition effects depend on two factors, codification and storage of episodes, is truly warranted. Unfortunately, an exploration of other types of simulation models is beyond the scope of this article.
Recognition, Repetition, and Codification
The recognition results at the one year test are both intriguing and puzzling. Although repetition benefits in identification are gone and pseudoword codification is retained largely intact, recognition exhibits intermediate results: above chance but fairly poor recognition of old words, but quite good recognition of old pseudowords. The result that recognition occurs after a year when repetition benefits are missing may be added to the long list of various patterns of dissociations between the repetition effect and recognition that exists in the literature. Dissociations exist in tasks such as identification (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982) , word fragment completion (Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982) , reading inverted text (Kolers, 1976) , and lexical decision (Carroll & Kirsner, 1982; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1979; Scarborough et al., 1977) . Thus, although episodic images may be involved in both repetition effects and recognition, they must have their effect in different ways (Jacoby, 1983a) . The Gillund and Shiffrin (1984) model of recognition suggests one way in which the present dissociations might occur. In their model, context cues and the test item are used jointly to probe memory (see Figure 11 ), but recognition is based on the summed total activations of all episodic images. Thus, the particular episodic image of the test item is not separately accessed. Similarly, in identification, a particular episodic image may not be activated alone; conceivably all images in memory may be activated as a group, but this would not help in identification. Nonetheless, feedback from each of these images to the letter level may determine the sharpening of lower-level features and letters.
The better recognition memory for pseudowords than words is somewhat surprising given that pseudowords are not particularly well recognized in immediate recognition tests. In general, low-frequency words are best recognized, with pseudowords either slightly better than or equal to high-frequency words (e.g., Mandler, Goodman, & WilkesGibbs, 1982; Rao, 1983; Rao & Proctor, 1984) . Several interpretations of these recognition results exist. Perhaps the subjects can identify the presence of a code in memory. If so, an inference could be made that any pseudoword with a code must have been one of those presented in the original training sessions. Alternatively, the presence of a code could indirectly help the subject gain access to appropriate episodic information. Finally, it may be argued that because pseudowords are not experienced during the one-year delay, they are not subject to interference as strongly as would be the case for high-frequency words. Deciding between these possibilities awaits further research.
Implications for Previous Accounts of Word Identification
Prior accounts of word identification are somewhat difficult to interpret in light of our data: Most established theories of visual word identification are given entirely in terms of permanent, semantic knowledge (Tulving, 1972) , for example, Morton's "logogen" model (1969 , 1979 ), Forster's search model (1976 , the verification model (Becker, 1976) , and the interactive activation model (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) .
In the logogen model, logogens or "word producers" (Morton, 1969) are permanent memory codes that respond when activated above threshold by either sensory or contextual information, or both. A firing logogen makes available to the system various lexical knowledge, including a phonological code used for identification. The principle of threshold lowering accounts for the word repetition effect, but additional mechanisms are required to explain pseudoword repetition benefits and codification.
McClelland and Rumelhart (1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982) proposed a hierarchical system of permanent memory nodes (including levels for letter features, letters, and words), where interactive activation of nodes underlies processing. When the combined input to a node exceeds its threshold, the node sends both excitatory and inhibitory feedback to other memory nodes. A lowered threshold from recent activation of a lexical node could account for repetition benefits for words, but pseudoword improvements would require the operation of additional processes on the outputs from feature and letter levels. As noted in the discussion of alternative models, McClelland and Rumelhart (in press) have recently adopted an episodic distributed memory approach, in which similar processes operate on words and pseudowords. Further details relating this development to the earlier interactive activation model are needed before this approach can be evaluated.
In Becker's (1976) verification model, input information activates a set of permanent lexical store representations. Each representation is a prototype "composed of information abstracted from previous encounters with a given word" (Becker, 1976, p. 564 ) and contains absolute and relational feature information that is used in identification. Verification of prototypes proceeds serially, according to word frequency or other expectancies. If word frequency is equated with recency (e.g., Dixon & Rothkopf, 1979; Hil-linger, 1980; Scarborough et al., 1977) , then the verification model would account for word repetition effects in terms of verification order. Although pseudoword repetition effects are not dealt with in this treatment, Besner and Swan (1982) proposed modifications to the model to deal with such effects. Note that Becker's (1976) model gives a general developmental account of the lexical store based on prior episodes.
In Forster's (1976) search model, the lexical entries in the permanent and abstract master file are accessed serially by visual input. Search progresses according to frequency and recency, and presumably order of access can account for the repetition benefits seen for words. Pseudoword performance and the origin of the master file lexical entries are not addressed by the model, and it is not obvious how the model would be extended for these purposes.
Our data draw attention to two difficulties faced by some of these accounts of word identification. First, the development of the codes in lexical memory is seldom addressed, although of obvious importance. Preliminary progress in this direction has come from Becker (1976) and McClelland and Rumelhart (in press ). The relation of the development processes to the mechanisms of the "mature" identification models will be important to the success of these models. Second, the influence of episodic memory for recent events is not always acknowledged explicitly (or in some cases, at all). One remedy for this problem is to expand the limited concept of "contextual knowledge" generally used in theories of language processing to a concept that includes episodic information. It seems necessary that recent, specific processing of episodes must be involved in effects of prior sentence or discourse context on word identification (for a review of sentence context effects, see West & Stanovich, 1982) . What is needed is to replace the current notion of top-down knowledge that is based on abstract linguistic and pragmatic constraints with a more explicit concept that covers all accessible information in memory. In this way, the influence of both episodic and permanent code information on identification can be measured, and in principle, the models could then handle the present data.
Our critical finding in this article is that the same repetitions produce both permanent and temporary facilitation. We suggest that codification permanently improves identification compared with noncoded letter strings (for reasons of top-down support and better feature utilization). As such, codification is an important developmental component in any account of human learning and memory; we have taken a first step toward describing its role in identification and the development of lexical memory. In our account, a second factor produces temporary improvement for all repeated items, probably due to the support of episodic memory images. We have presented a methodology and a model that show how these two separable memory factors interactively facilitate the identification of repeated letter strings. The view that both permanent codes and episodic images determine identification interactively is perhaps more complex than earlier accounts based on the traditional semantic-episodic distinction (Tulving, 1972) , but is in the spirit of such an approach.
